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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent , 
vs. 
FRANCIS PRESTON MITCHELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860237 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVER-
SIBLE ERROR BY ADMITTING PATRICIA 
TYRELL'S POST-HYPNOTIC TESTIMONY. 
As the State correctly states on page 15 of its Brief, 
the issue of admissibility of testimony from a previously 
hypnotized witness is an issue which has not yet been decided in 
the State of Utah. The State maintains that this Court should 
adopt what it represents as the "majority rule" and admit such 
evidence. In support of that statement, the State cites State v. 
Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983). In Brown, the Supreme Court 
of North Dakota stated that the majority of the jurisdictions 
hold that hypnotically induced testimonial recall affected only 
the weight or credibility of the testimony as opposed to its 
admissibility. Brown, supra, at 149. The Court in Brown, cited 
numerous cases which, the Court claimed, constituted a majority 
position. 
It is Defendant's position that the Court in Brown 
erred in its analysis and that the alleged "majority" position, 
as set forth in Brown, is not the majority position at all. The 
seminal case on the issue of the admissibility of hypnotically 
recalled testimony was the case of Harding v. State, 246 A.2d 302 
(1968), Cert denied 395 U.S. 949 (1969). The Harding court held: 
The fact that the witness had told 
different stories or had achieved a present 
knowledge after being hypnotized concerns the 
question of the weight of the evidence which 
the trier of facts, in this case the jury, 
must decide. 
Under this view, the use of hypnosis to stimulate recall is 
treated no differently than other methods of refreshing recollec-
tion. Accordingly, cross-examination, the presentation of expert 
testimony on the dangers of hypnosis, and cautionary instructions 
are thouqht to provide sufficient guarantees to permit a jury to 
evaluate the credibility of previously hypnotized witnesses. See 
P. Giannelli and E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence, 1986, page 
358. Virtually all of the cases which allow for the admission of 
hypnotically induced recall rely upon the Hard ing rationale. 
These cases were decided before the courts began to view hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony critically and before the publication 
of the views of several authorities who questioned the relia-
bility of such testimony. Indeed, Hard ing was specifically 
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overruled by the Maryland Supreme Court in Collins v. State, 464 
A.2d 1028 (1983) . 
The Brown opinion also relies upon the North Carolina 
Supreme Court opinion of State v. McQueen, 244 S.E.2d 414 (N.C. 
1978). However, in August of 1984, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court had an opportunity to consider the McQueen opinion in State 
v. Peoples, 319 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. 1984), where it said, regarding 
its decision in McQueen: 
At the time of our decision in McQueen, 
however, we were not apprised of the problems 
inherent in hypnosis. Much of the literature 
and judicial analysis regarding hypnosis has 
emerged since McQueen was decided. Because 
of recent developments and the understanding 
of hypnosis as a tool to refresh or restore 
memory, and the judicial trend away from 
acceptance of "hypnotically refreshed" 
testimony, we now reexamine our position in 
McQueen in light of the facts before us. 
Our review of the state of the art of 
hypnosis and the judicial decisions which 
have considered the admissibility of "hyp-
notically refreshed" testimony lead us to 
conclude that our decision in McQueen should 
be overruled insofar that it permits the 
admission of "hypnotically refreshed" 
test imony...Hypnotically refreshed testimony 
is simply too unreliable to be used as 
evidence in a judicial setting. 
Brown also cites Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. 
1982) as aligning the state of Indiana with what it characterizes 
as the majority opinion. However, to the extent that Pearson 
stood for the proposition that hypnotically induced testimony 
went to weight, not admissibility, that opinion was overruled in 
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State v. Peterson, 448 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. 1983) wherein it said at 
page 675: 
This b r i ngs us to P e t e r s o n ' s p r e c i s e 
issue which is whether or not a p r e v i o u s l y 
hypnot ized wi tness should be pe rmi t t ed to 
t e s t i f y in a criminal proceeding concerning a 
s u b j e c t mat te r adduced during a p r e t r i a l 
hypnotic interview. I t i s our holding t h a t 
such a witness should not be so permitted to 
t e s t i f y . 
The Brown opinion a l so a l i g n s Louis iana with those 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s es tab l i sh ing what i t terms the "majority" pos i t i on . 
The t r u t h of the matter is tha t State v. Wren, 425 S.E.2d 756 
(La. 1983) does not stand for the p r o p o s i t i o n r ep re sen t ed by 
Brown nor impl ic i t ly argued by the State in t h i s case . In Wren, 
there was no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between the p r e - h y p n o t i c 
t es t imony and the pos t -hypnot ic testimony. The Court in Wren 
said regarding the d e f e n d a n t ' s argument t h a t a person who i s 
hypnotized is rendered incompetent to t e s t i f y as establ ished by 
State v. Sh i r ley , 641 P.2d 775 (Calif . 1982) and Mena as follows 
at page 759: 
In our opinion these cases are distin-
guishable from the present case. As we noted 
earlier, we are not required to directly 
consider whether hypnotically induced 
testimony is admissible in criminal trials 
because Vanderhooven1s hypnosis caused him to 
give no information which he had not already 
given. Therefore, under these circumstances 
hypnosis should go to the question of proper 
weight to be given the testimony rather than 
to the question of admissibility. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana in 
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State v, Culpepper, 434 S.2d 76 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1982) ruled 
that hypnotically affected testimony is not admissible where it 
said at page 83: 
We are of the opinion that the inherent 
hazards in the use of hypnotically refreshed 
testimony are very similar to the dangers 
noted in Cantonese in the use of polygraph 
evidence. Consequently, the reasons assigned 
in Cantonese for excluding polygraph results 
are similarly applicable to the exclusion of 
hypnotically affected testimony. 
The most that can be said is that the Louisiana Supreme 
Court did not reach the issue in Wren because pre and post-
hypnotic testimony did not differ. The Court of Appeals in 
Louisiana has specifically ruled that hypnotically refreshed 
testimony is inadmissible. Therefore it is not proper to view 
Louisiana as one of the jurisdictions that holds that hypnosis 
goes to weight, not admissibility. 
Brown also cites the Tennessee case of State v. 
Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1981) as aligning with what 
it calls the majority opinion.1 However, the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee in State v. Hartmen, 703 S.W.2d 106, 115 (Tenn. 1985) 
held as follows: 
The trial judge required the State to 
give defendant the two statements made by 
Jackson before the hypnosis and the statement 
made by Jackson during hypnosis. The trial 
1
 In Glebock the Court of Appeals did not reach the issue 
because defendant failed to move to exclude the testimony and the 
court ruled he had waived any error by failing to so object. 
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judge r e s t r i c t e d Jackson's testimony before 
the jury to the facts he had re la ted in his 
pre-hypnosis statement and did not allow any 
tes t imony as to the f a c t s e l i c i t e d on ly 
during hypnosis. 
Therefore, to al ign Tennessee with what Brown charac-
t e r i z e s as the majori ty p o s i t i o n i s not a c c u r a t e . Tennessee 
c l e a r l y a l i g n s i t s e l f with those j u r i s d i c t i o n s which l imit the 
wi tness ' s testimony to pre-hypnotic testimony. 
Brown a l so includes the s t a t e of I l l i n o i s in what i t 
considers to be the majority pos i t i on . However, as pointed out 
in the Addendum to Respondent's Brief , the Appe l l a t e Court of 
I l l i n o i s ' s F i r s t D i s t r i c t , F i f th D i v i s i o n , r e l y i n g upon the 
I l l i n o i s Supreme Court in People v. Cohoon, 104 111.2d 295, 472 
N.E.2d 403 (111. 1984), held as follows: 
Based on a l l t h e s e a u t h o r i t i e s , we 
c o n c l u d e t h a t I l l i n o i s l i k e t h e c l e a r 
m a j o r i t y of o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s in t h i s 
c o u n t r y , should not g e n e r a l l y pe rmi t t h e 
cou r t room use of h y p n o t i c a l l y enhanced 
evidence because of the fundamental problem 
of r e l i a b i l i t y inherent in such testimony. 
The court went on to hold that under the p a r t i c u l a r facts of that 
case the er ror was harmless. 
The p r e c e d e n t i a l value of many of these older cases , 
which were decided p r i o r to the a v a i l a b i l i t y of most of the 
s c i e n t i f i c l i t e r a t u r e on the subject has been ser ious ly put in 
ques t ion. (See general ly Addendum to Appel lant ' s Br ie f . ) 
The two j u r i s d i c t i o n s tha t seem to be holding to the 
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outdated view that hypnosis effects credibility, not admis-
sibility, are North Dakota in Brown and Wyoming in Chapman v. 
State, 638 P.2d 1280. Brown was a 1983 opinion and Chapman was a 
1982 opinion. The analysis appears to go something like this. 
Since the human mind is able to store perceptions similar to a 
tape recording device or a video camera, hypnosis is simply a 
means of pushing the appropriate recall button. Indeed, Chapman 
framed the issue this way at 1282: 
The issue relative to the admissibility 
of testimony of witnesses who were previously 
hypnotized is whether the product of the 
hypnosis was to refresh or develop the 
witness's own recollection or to teach the 
witness and add additional facts to the 
recollection beyond that which has been 
mentally stored in the memory, consciously or 
unconsciously. The issue is properly one for 
the fact finder — as are all issues relative 
to the credibility of the witness. (Emphasis 
added.) 
If one accepts the premise that all of what we perceive 
is somehow stored in the memory bank and that all we need to do 
is punch the appropriate button, then the effect of hypnosis is 
marginal. However, the scientific literature points to the 
reconstructive theory of memory which is to say that we are 
continually structuring our memory through the various phases of 
the "memory process." 
In fact, this Court in State v. Long , 721 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986) recognized this reconstruction theory of memory when 
it said: 
Some background is necessary. Anyone 
who stops to consider the matter will 
recognize that the process of perceiving 
events and remembering them is not as simple 
or as certain as turning on a camera and 
recording everything the camera sees on tape" 
or film for later replay. What we perceive 
and remember is the result of a much more 
complex process, one that does not occur 
without involving the whole person, and one 
that is profoundly effected by who we are and 
what we bring to the event of perception. 
(Citation omitted.) 
Research on human memory has consis-
tently shown that failures may occur and 
inaccuracies creep in at any stage of what we 
broadly refer to as the "memory process." 
This process includes the acquisition of 
information, its storage, and its retrieval 
and communication to others. These stages 
have all been extensively studied in recent 
years and a wide variety of factors influenc-
ing each stage have been identified. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Long opinion then goes on to detail, with some care, the 
workings of the human mind as it relates to memory.2 
Although the Long opinion concerned itself with the 
2
 See F. Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert 
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness 
Identification, 29 Stan.L.Rev. 969 (1977);J. Bibicoff, Seeing is 
Believing? "The Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions on the 
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 11 San 
Fernando Valley L.Rev. 95 (1983); R. Sanders, Helping the Jury 
Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony: The Need for Additional Safe-
guard s, 12 Am. J.Crim.Law 189 (1984); ¥~. Wall, Eyewitness Iden^ 
tification Criminal Cases (1965); E. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony 
(1979); State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 62-66 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting); R. Buckhout, Eyewitness Test imony, 15 Jurimetrics J. 
171, 179 (1975) (reprinted from 231 Scientific American 23 (Dec. 
1974); I.D. Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A 
Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 1970 Utah L.Rev. 1, 38. 
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appropriateness of giving an "eyewitness identification" instruc-
tion previously referred to as the Tel faire instruction, the 
analysis as far as forensic hypnosis is concerned is helpful. 
The theoretical starting point begins with the presumption that 
the mind operates as a tape recorder or that the mind operates in 
a reconstructive fashion. Those jurisdictions which have held 
that hypnosis effects weight and not admissibility view the mind 
as working like a tape recorder, which is simply false. Those 
jurisdictions limiting hypnotically induced recall have a more 
scientifically sound starting place in their analysis. This 
starting point has been recognized in Long as the "reconstructive 
theory of memory." Only under that theoretical framework does it 
make sense to consider the inherent problems associated with 
hypnosis in the forensic setting.3 
The Court in Brown and the State of Utah also proffer 
the case of Creamer v. State, 205 S.E.2d 240 (Ga. 1984). The 
problem with the Creamer case is the same problem that occurred 
in Narcisso, 446 F.Sup. 252 (E.Dist.Mich. 1977). In Creamer, the 
Court allowed the admission of post-hypnotic testimony and 
determined that hypnosis did not taint that person's testimony. 
In support of that, the Court indicated that the witness had 
given the principal facts and details before the hypnotic 
session. I<3. at 242. Creamer is not applicable to this case. 
3 See Point I of Appellant's Brief. 
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Again, Appellant does not claim that the taint occurred at the 
hypnotic session. As the record clearly indicates in both 
Appellant's and Respondent's previous briefs, the statements of 
Patricia Tyrell given before she was hypnotized do not coincide 
with the statements that she gave after she was hypnotized. Most 
obvious is the issue of whether or not the Defendant in this case 
was wearing a mask. The presence of a mask would indicate that 
the murder was planned. No mention of a mask was made in any of 
the statements that Patricia Tyrell gave to the police prior to 
the time that she was hypnotized. The alleged presence of the 
mask and the inference that the killing was planned, effectively 
destroyed any defense Appellant may have had that the shooting 
was accidental. 
The Court in Brown and the State of Utah also give us 
the case of People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill.App.3d. 379, 24 111.Dec. 
707, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979). Here the lack of reasoning by the 
State on the issue of hypnosis becomes painfully clear. The 
Court in Smrekar cited the cases of State v. McQueen, and Harding 
v. State, among others. Both Harding and McQueen have since been 
overruled. It should further be noted that the scientific 
literature that was examined by the Illinois Court predated the 
bulk of scientific study in that area. The Court in Smrekar ack-
nowledged concern over the possibility of suggestion in a 
hypnotic setting. Id^ . at 854. While the Court cited United 
10 
States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978) it indicated that 
the significance of Adams was not clear. Ic3. at 855. Smrekar 
essentially proposed a four-pronged test for admissibility of 
post-hypnotic identification. IQ. at 855. The Court indicated 
that if 1) the hypnotist was competent, 2) the evidence shows 
that suggestion was not used, 3) the identification was cor-
roborated by evidence unknown to the witness at the time he or 
she made the identification, and 4) at the time of the occurrence 
the witness had an ample opportunity to view that individual, 
then post-hypnotic identification would be admissable. 1(3. at 
855. Again, Appellant points out that the identification in this 
particular case was not corroborated by evidence unknown to 
Patricia Tyrell at the time she made the identification. In 
fact, the identity of Preston Mitchell and the fact that he was 
the suspect, the fact that he had had difficulties with Fred 
Duncan and the fact that they hated each other were all known to 
Patricia Tyrell at the time she made the identification. 
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that at the time of the 
shooting, Patricia Tyrell had no ample opportunity to view the 
individual in the room. This is clear from the statements that 
she gave and conversations had with the police prior to being 
hypnotized. In short, the facts of the case at bar do not 
satisfy the standard set forth in Smrekar. More importantly, 
however, the case of People v. Smrekar does not stand for the 
11 
principle of law argued for by the Respondent in this case. 
Respondent offers the case of Morgan v. State, 445 
N.E.2d 585 (Ind.App. 1983) in support of its position. However, 
the Court in Morgan relied on the decision in Pearson, which, as 
we have seen, has been overruled by Peterson. 
The State also argues tha* its position is in con-
formity with the Utah Rules of Evidence 601 which provides, 
"Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise 
provided in these rules." 
Defendant contends that the federal case law referred 
to in Brown has no application in the instant case. A classic 
example of this is the case of United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 
667 (1979). The State argues that the position as set forth in 
Awkard constitutes the federal trend. While at first glance it 
appears that the Court in Awkard holds against Defendant's 
position, but the following language should be noted. The Court 
in the Awkard case relied on two other cases, both out of the 
Ninth Circuit. The first case that Awkard relied on was United 
States v. Adams. In Ad am s, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that: 
In jurisdictions in which the admis-
sibility of hypnotically refreshed evidence 
is still an open question, a foundation 
concerning the reliability of hypnosis is no 
doubt necessary. 
(Id. at 669.) Since this is a case of first impression in the 
State of Utah, the above-principle should have been followed in 
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this case. As the trial record indicates, no such foundation was 
laid . 
Language in the Adams decision indicates that the 
rationale behind that particular decision does not apply to the 
case at bar. The Court acknowledged the dangerous potential for 
abuse when hypnosis is involved and cautioned that care should be 
taken that a hypnotized person testifies as to his or her own 
recollections and not tainted recall. Ad am s, supra, at 198. The 
Court further went on to note that it did not approve of the 
methods of hypnosis used in that particular case, but because no 
objection to the adequacy of the foundation was raised at trial, 
the matter could not be considered on appeal. IcL at 199. Ob-
viously, the ruling in the Adams case does not apply to the 
instant case and its value as precedent is dubious at best. 
However, the Courtf s concern for potential abuse should not be 
ignored. The Court in Awkard also relied on the case of Cline v. 
Ford Motor Company, Inc., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975). The 
Court in CI ine stated that the witness in that case who had 
undergone hypnosis prior to trial was competent to testify. Id. 
at 1069. The Court explained that the witness was deemed 
competent because she was capable of expressing herself and 
understood her duty as a witness to tell the truth. IcK at 1069. 
As should be noted, the CI ine case was decided in 1975, some 
years before the bulk of scientific research and evaluation had 
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been done on the issue of hypnosis. Furthermore, the holding in 
CIine begs the question. It is difficult to see how an in-
dividual who has been hypnotized (and subjected himself to 
suggestion or to some type of reinforcement or other influence) 
is capable of discerning whether or not he is telling the truth. 
Under normal circumstances any witness knows if he is lying. 
After hypnosis, however, an individual may no longer be able to 
tell if what he is testifying to was pre-hypnotic or post-
hypnotic recall. That being the case, no witness would be 
competent to testify subsequent to hypnosis. In short, it can be 
seen that the Awkard decision relied on a case, Adams, which 
dealt with the issue of waiver of an objection to foundation, and 
the CI ine case, which predated the bulk of research and data 
accumulated on the issue of hypnosis and which provided no 
adequate rationale for its decision. 
The Court in Brown noted a number of other decisions 
which, it claims, supported its decision. As can be seen from 
Respondent's Brief, such references and authority have been 
adopted wholesale by the State in this case. The fallacy of 
doing so will soon become apparent. The Court in Brown and the 
Respondent in this case offer the case of United States v. 
Waksal , 539 F.Sup. 834 (S.Dist.Fl. 1982). Respondent contends 
that this case cuts against Appellant's position. A careful 
reading of Waksal distinguishes it from the case at bar. The 
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Court in Waksal cited Awkard , Ad am s, and Cline and proceeded to 
admit post-hypnotic testimony by the witness in that case . Id . 
at 838. What is in te res t ing to note , however, is the fact tha t 
the pre-hypnot ic testimony of the witness was ident ica l to the 
p o s t - h y p n o t i c s t a t emen t s of t h a t same w i t n e s s . Ld. at 838. 
Clear ly , the Court in Waksal f e l t much more inclined to admit the 
post-hypnotic statements because there was no difference between 
them and the pre-hypnotic s tatements . Appellant submits that the 
grounds for the decision in Waksal have no corre la t ion to t h i s 
c a s e . Respondent a l so o f f e r s the case of United S t a t e v . 
Narcisso, in support of i t s pos i t i on . However, a careful reading 
of that case also indicates that the grounds for that decision do 
not address the issues presented in t h i s case. In the Narcisso 
case, the Court based i t s decision on whether or not the c i r -
cumstances surrounding the hypnosis were unduly suggest ive. Id. 
at 281. In t h i s case, Appellant does not claim that the t a i n t 
arose at the hypnosis sess ion . Rather, Appellant claims that the 
t a i n t occurred much e a r l i e r in interviews of the witness with the 
Park City P o l i c e Department in which Appellant was named as a 
prime s u s p e c t . Appel lant ma in ta ins t h a t the exper i ence of 
hypnosis s o l i d i f i e d the in -put given to the wi tness by the 
po l i ce . Appellant contends that the s i tua t ion which was feared 
by the Court in Adams has in fact occurred. I t is c lear from the 
w i t n e s s ' s p r e -hypno t i c and p o s t - h y p n o t i c s ta tements that her 
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identification of the Appellant was tainted recall and not her 
own independent recollection. 
Respondent persists in the notion that federal courts 
have also adopted the rule admitting the testimony of a witness 
who has been placed under hypnosis. In further support of that 
position, Respondent cites the case Sprynczynatyk v. General 
Motors Corporation , 77] F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985), McQueen v. 
Garrison, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987), and Wicker v. McCotter, 
783 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1986). By offering these previous three 
cases in support of its position, it is evident that Respondent 
is retreating from its original position. Each of the three 
cases cited above stand for the proposition that appeals on the 
issue of hypnosis should be looked at on a case by case basis. 
These cases neither advocate per se exclusion of post-hypnotic 
testimony, nor per se admission of post-hypnotic testimony which 
is the position that Respondent advocates. This position was 
also taken in the case of Harkes v. State of Maryland, 800 F.2d 
437. The case of United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210 (7th 
Cir. 1986) also retreated dramatically from the so-called federal 
trend. In that case, the Court evaluated the testimony of each 
of the witnesses and indicated that any post-hypnotic testimony 
that was given was either inconclusive or not prejudicial to the 
defendant. Id_. at 223. It is clear that the Court chose to 
compare pre-hypnotic and post-hypnotic testimony ala Waksal and 
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Creamer and finding no significant distinction and no evidence 
that was critical to the conviction, chose to admit it on those 
grounds. I<3. This case and the other federal cases heretofore 
mentioned represent a far cry from the standard of per se 
admissibility advocated by the Respondent. It is clear then that 
if anything
 f the federal trend is far different from that which 
is set forth by the Respondent. Respondent, however, neglects 
these facts and states that because the Utah Rules of Evidence 
were modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence, this Court 
should follow the federal position by ruling that the testimony 
of Patricia Tyrell was properly admitted at trial. The Respon-
dent goes on to cite Utah Rule of Evidence 102 which states: 
These rules should be construed to 
secure fairness in administration, elimina-
tion of unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
promotion of growth and development of a law 
of evidence to the end that the truth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly deter-
mined. 
Whether or not hypnosis "secures fairness in administration" and 
promotes "growth and development of a law of evidence to the end 
that truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined" 
is a question of perspective. What Respondent is really saying 
is that if this Court rejects the per se admissibility standard, 
the State will be put to unjustifiable expense and delay in 
having to give Mr. Mitchell a new trial. Appellant argues that 
judicial expense and economy simply do not stack up against the 
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life and liberty of an individual. 
Respondent urges this Court to adopt what it terms to 
be the federal trend because Utah adopted the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. It should be noted at this time that the states of 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Michigan, California, 
Arizona, Nebraska, New York, Louisiana, North Carolina, Connec-
ticut, Kansas, Florida, Indiana, Colorado, Washington, Hawaii, 
Arkansas, and Alaska all disallow hypnotically induced testimony. 
See footnote 3 on page 30 of Appellant's Brief. Of these states, 
Nebraska, North Carolina, Florida, Colorado, Hawaii, and Arkansas 
also have substantially adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
specifically Rule 601 verbatim.4 It should also be noted that 
Massachusetts, Arizona, Washington, and Pennsylvania all have 
similar provisions to Rule 601. Clearly, to adopt the alleged 
federal "trend" because the Utah Rules of Evidence are patterned 
after the Federal Rules of Evidence would be illogical. Other 
states have declined to take such an approach. As noted earlier, 
the federal trend as set forth by the Respondent is not the 
4 l) Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 27-601. 
2) General Statutes of North Carolina, Evidence Code 
Rule 601. 
3) Florida Statutes 1985, 90.601. 
4) Colorado Revised Statutes, Vol. 7B, Article VI, 
Rule 601. 
5) Hawaii Revised Statutes, Volume II, Title 33, Rule 
601. 
6) Arkansas Statutes Annotated, Uniform Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 601. 
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federal trend at all. 
At this point, it becomes difficult to see how Respon-
dent can argue that its position is in fact the majority posi-
tion. 
Respondent cites the decision of Rock v. Arkansasf 107 
S.Ct. 2704 (1987) in which the United States Supreme Court struck 
down Arkansas's per se rule of excluding a criminal defendant's 
hypnotically refreshed testimony. Respondent asserts that a 
similar rationale should apply in the instant case. Rock is 
easily distinguished in that the hypnotically refreshed testimony 
in that case was that of the defendant himself. As should be 
noted, the decision in Rock was a 5-4 decision with four United 
States Supreme Court Justices evidently deciding that hypnosis is 
so inherently flawed and risky that it outweighs a defendant's 
almost absolute right to testify in his own behalf. It should 
also be noted that in reaching this decision, the Rock court held 
in footnote 15: 
This case did not involve the admis-
sibility of testimony of previously hypno-
tized witnesses other than criminal defen-
dants and we express no opinion on that 
issue. 
Clearly the United States Supreme Court chose not to reach that 
issue in that particular case and as suchf Rock is not control-
ling in the instant case. The issue in Rock was the right of the 
criminal defendant to testify in his own behalf, which right is 
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practically absolute. The inherent unreliability of hypnosis was 
weighed against that right and that right alone. At this point, 
it becomes clear that Respondent has offered very little case 
law that truly supports its position and none of any recent 
origin. 
POINT II: THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY THE 
FRYE TEST TO THE ADMISSIBILITY 
OF HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED 
RECALL. 
The State urges the Court not to adopt the Frye test to 
hypnotic recall. The initial question, in determining the 
admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony, concerns the 
applicable standard for admitting scientific evidence. Many 
jurisdictions follow the general acceptance standard set forth in 
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923). Under the Frye 
test, evidence derived from a new scientific technique is 
admissible only if the technique is "sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in a particular field in which it 
belongs." There is disagreement over the applicability of the 
Frye test to hypnotically refreshed statements, even in jurisdic-
tions that follow the general acceptance standard. For example, 
soon after the Michigan Supreme Court held that hypnotically 
refreshed testimony did not satisfy the Frye test in People v. 
Gonzales, 329 N.W.2d 743, 748 (1982), modified on other grounds 
336 N.W.2d 751 (1983), the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that 
Frye was limited to expert testimony and thus not applicable to 
20 
h y p n o t i c a l l y ref reshed testimony, which typ i ca l l y involves lay 
witnesses . State v. Armstrong, 329 N.W.2d 386, 393f Cert denied 
461 U.S. 946 (1983). The State c i t e s the Armstrong opinion as 
control l ing on t h i s i s sue . 
This Court has ruled in Ph i l l i p s by and through Utah, 
e t c . , v . Jackson , 615 P.2d 1228 (1980) when cons ider ing the 
admiss ib i l i ty of HLA blood t e s t r e su l t as follows: 
We next turn to the issue of the legal 
s t a n d a r d s which determine the admiss ib i l i ty 
of s c i e n t i f i c evidence. The most widely used 
s tandard for making t h a t determination was 
formulated in Frye v. United S t a t e s , 293 F. 
1013 (D.C. Cir . 1923) . 
The Frye t e s t has been adopted by a 
m a j o r i t y of t h o s e j u r i s d i c t i o n s in t h i s 
country which have establ ished s t andards to 
be appl ied in admitting s c i e n t i f i c evidence 
which i s new to the court room. Frye held 
that s c i e n t i f i c t e s t s s t i l l in the experimen-
t a l s t ages should not be admitted in ev i -
dence, but tha t s c i e n t i f i c testimony deduced 
from a "well recognized s c i e n t i f i c p r inc ip le 
or discovery" i s admissible if the s c i e n t i f i c 
p r inc ip le from which the deduction is made is 
" s u f f i c i e n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d to have g a i n e d 
general acceptance in the pa r t i cu la r f ield in 
which i t belongs." 
The Utah Supreme Court in Ph i l l i p s and those j u r i s d i c -
t i o n s which have adopted and appl ied the Frye founda t iona l 
requirements to the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of new s c i e n t i f i c evidence 
recognized as t h i s Court did in Ph i l l i p s t h a t : 
Various l e g a l s c h o l a r s have proposed 
o t h e r founda t iona l s t a n d a r d s by which to 
determine a d m i s s i b i l i t y of new s c i e n t i f i c 
e v i d e n c e . The paramount concern i s , of 
21 
coursef whether the evidence is sufficiently 
reliable. Different types of scientific 
evidence may pose varying and sometimes 
difficult problems for the integrity of the 
fact-finding process, but in an age when one 
scientific advancement tumbles in rapid 
succession upon another and may be known only 
among a limited circle of scientistsf we are 
not inclined to adopt a standard that would 
deprive the judicial process of relevant 
scientific evidence simply because it is of 
recent vintage or because knowledge of the 
principles , or the process for applying a 
principle, is limited to a small but highly 
specialized group of experts. Tests that 
have passed from the experimental stage may 
be admissible if their reliability is 
reasonably demonstrable. (Citations omitted, 
emphasis added.) 
Nearly every court that has considered the contention 
that Frye does not apply to hypnosis has rejected it. People v. 
Shirley, 181 Cal.Rptr. at 263, 641 P.2d at 795 (Frye test applies 
to evidence "based upon" or "developed by" new scientific 
techniques); Polk v. State, 48 Md.App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041, 1048 
(1981) ("The induced recall of the witness is dependent upon, and 
cannot be disassociated from, the underlying scientific method"); 
People v. Gonzales; State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768 (although 
hypnotically adduced recall not strictly analogous to mechanical 
testing, Frye equally applicable); State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d at 91; 
Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d at 172 ("[A]ny means by 
which evidence is scientifically adduced must satisfy the 
standard established in Frye."). 
The Alaskan Supreme Court, in a 1986 opinion in Con-
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treras v. Alaska, 718 P.2d 129 (Ala. 1986), held as follows: 
The state argues that the Frye test is 
only applicable to expert testimony regarding 
the reliability of information obtained 
through a scientific technique and is not 
meant to apply to the testimony of a pre-
viously hypnotized witness. In our view, the 
state1s reading of Frye is unduly narrow. 
The principles and policies supporting the 
Frye test apply equally to hypnotically 
adduced lay testimony. Further, Frye is 
applicable because lay testimony that is 
dependent upon hypnosis cannot be logically 
dissociated from the underlying scientific 
technique... 
There is little question that hypnosis 
fails to qualify under Frye. Applying Frye 
is a two-step process: first, the relevant 
scientific community must be defined, and 
second, the testimony and publications of the 
relevant experts in the field must be 
evaluated to determine if there is general 
consensus that hypnotically adduced testimony 
is reliable . . . 
Consideration of the hypnosis literature 
as reviewed by the litigants and as set out 
by the court of appeals makes it clear that 
there is no consensus as to what hypnosis is 
or what it actually does. In its fledgling 
state, the "science" of hypnosis is far too 
underdeveloped to qualify under the Frye 
standard. Moreover, although there is 
insufficient empirical research to fully 
substantiate either side!s claims about the 
benefits and dangers of hypnosis, it is quite 
clear that the previously hypnotized witness 
may be prey to the distortions wrought by 
suggestion, confabulation, and increased 
confidence. 
It doesnft make a great deal of sense to argue, as the 
State does, that in order for Frye to be applicable to a new 
scientific technique that the only concern is the receipt of 
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expert testimony regarding that scientific principle. There is 
no doubt that hypnosis is a new technique that is scientific in 
nature. The principles and policies supporting the Frye test 
apply equally to hypnotically adduced lay testimony. In factf 
this Court, in Phillips, indicated that the underlying purpose 
and policy for establishing foundational requirements for the 
admissibility of new scientific evidence is, of course, whether 
the scientific technique is "sufficiently reliable." The 
Phillips court also indicated that there were different types of 
scientific evidence which may pose varying and sometimes dif-
ficult problems for the integrity of the fact-finding process, 
indicating that tests that have passed from the experimental 
stage may be admissible if their reliability is "reasonably 
demonstrable." 
In the case at bar, the only expert to testify regard-
ing hypnosis was an expert produced by the Defendant who tes-
tified that hypnosis, in its forensic setting, had not obtained 
general acceptance within the relevant scientific community as a 
valid method of refreshing recollection. The State produced no 
expert to testify that it had obtained that recognition and 
indeed the State could not produce such an expert. 
The State argues that this Court ought not to subject 
hypnosis to the Frye criteria because it would be thwarting the 
truth-finding function of the courts. It is interesting to note 
24 
that the reason for establishing foundational requirements for 
the receipt of evidence derived from a new scientific principle 
is to insure the integrity of the truth-finding function of the 
courts. In fact, the Alaskan court ruled that the Frye test was, 
in effect, a prejudial v. probative value test as established in 
403 of the Rules of Evidence, 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court ought to apply 
the Frye criteria as established in Phillips , supra, to the 
admissibility of hypnotically induced recall. 
POINT III: PATRICIA TYRELLfS HYPNOTICALLY 
REFRESHED TESTIMONY WAS 
INADMISSIBLE AND SUCH ERROR 
WAS NOT HARMLESS TO DEFENDANT. 
The State contends in its brief that even if the Court 
erred in not limiting Tyrell's testimony to pre-hypnotic recall 
that such error was harmless to Defendant. Respondent cites the 
case of State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985), and Rule 30 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure for this proposition. In 
order to understand the importance of issue, a brief rendition of 
some of the critical facts is in order. Tyrell was the only 
eyewitness to this incident. After she observed whatever she 
observed in the Oliver home that evening, she was interviewed by 
Frank Bell, Chief of Police of Park City. She indicated at that 
time that the voice of the angry caller who called the Oliver 
residence at 10:00 p.m. that evening could have been Tom Greco's 
voice. The fact that Greco made this telephone call to the 
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Oliver residence, which he denies, is borne out directly by the 
testimony of Hank Verone who said that he had been called by Tom 
Greco and that Tom Greco had in fact placed that telephone call 
to the Oliver residence and asked Greco to go over and ask Brian 
Oliver to put the phone back on the hook. Tyrell also told Bell 
during her pre-hypnotic interviews that she observed one male, 
approximately six feet tall, medium build, wearing dark clothing, 
enter the home, and that she saw no other details of the man. 
She also indicated that when the man entered the residence she 
bolted out the front door and while doing so heard a pop, that 
she made these observations through peripheral vision as she was 
leaving the house. Prior to hypnosis she related to Bell the 
fact that she did not know whether Tom Greco and Preston Mitchell 
knew each other. She told the Grand Jury that she didn't know 
how well Fred Duncan knew Preston Mitchell. She also indicated 
that the reason she was hypnotized is "to know who it was," also 
indicating that prior to hypnosis she could not come up with why 
she could not see his face. 
After having reported these facts to the authorities, 
but prior to hypnosis, Ms. Tyrell acquired virtually every fact 
associated with the investigation. She had over twenty telephone 
conversations with Chief Bell, learned that Preston Mitchell was 
the prime suspect, had been shown Mitchell's picture, and was 
aware of the fact that the ballistics matched, that Preston 
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Mitchell was in Park City on the evening of the homicide, that 
according to the authorities he had placed the angry telephone 
call, and by her own testimony had become very involved in the 
investigation. Trans. January 16, 1986, pages 7-21 and Tyrell 
Tr. 
As reported by Orne in Hypnotically Refreshed Tes-
timony; Enhanced Memory or Tampering with Evidence? cited in 
Appellant's Brief and included in the Addendum at pages 19-20, 
the author states: 
Hypnosis is likely to provide useful 
information with minimum risk in investiga-
tive situations when the facts in question 
are not known or presumed....Where there are 
few or no preconceptions, hypnosis may 
directly or indirectly enhance memory, and 
the relaxed environment of a sensitively 
conducted hypnotic session may help to 
diminish anxiety that may otherwise interfere 
with attempts to recall. If used solely to 
obtain clues that ultimately lead to the 
collection of independent evidence, the use 
of hypnosis is a means to an end that is no 
different than the use of other reliable 
sources by the police. 
In contrast to the investigative uses 
are situations where hypnosis is employed to 
help provide eyewitnesses who can testify in 
court. As the emphasis shifts away from the 
investigative search for clues that may lead 
to reliable independent physical evidence and 
more toward preparation of witnesses to give 
eyewitness testimony, hypnosis presents 
increasingly greater difficulties for the 
administration of justice. 
The most extreme risk of miscarriage of 
justice is the case in which hypnosis is used 
to "refresh" a witness's or victim's memory 
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about aspects of a crime that are presumed or 
known to the a u t h o r i t i e s . , , . I n such cases a 
"memory" can be c rea ted in hypnosis where 
none existed before and the wi tness ' s memory 
may be i r r e v e r s i b l y c o n t a m i n a t e d . The 
hypnot ized person may ob ta in in format ion 
about the event from the media, from comments 
made pr ior t o , during f or af ter an in ter roga-
t i on or from the hypnot ic sess ion i t s e l f . 
Based on what i s c u r r e n t l y known about 
hypnosis and i t s ef fects on memory, there is 
s ign i f ican t l ikel ihood that t h i s information 
wil l form the basis of confabulation and wil l 
become i n e x t r i c a b l y i n t e r tw ined with the 
sub j ec t ' s own memories of the event . 
The a l tered memory tends to p e r s i s t , and 
the more frequently the subject repor ts the 
e v e n t s , the more f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h e 
a l tered memory wil l become. These "hypnoti-
ca l ly- ref reshed" memories are of ten accom-
p a n i e d by i n c r e a s e d c o n f i d e n c e and a r e 
c o n s e q u e n t l y o f t e n not s u b j e c t t o f a i r 
t es t ing through cross examination or appl ica-
t ion o"f s tandard TndTcTa of r e l iab i l i t y . 
(Emphasis added.) 
As reported also in The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in 
Court at Addendum page 43 to Appel lant ' s Brief, the a u t h o r i t i e s 
further conclude: 
While p o t e n t i a l l y usefu l to r e f r e sh 
wi tness ' s and v i c t im ' s memory to f a c i l i t a t e 
eyewi tness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , the procedure is 
r e l a t i v e l y safe and a p p r o p r i a t e only when 
nei ther the subjec t , nor the a u t h o r i t i e s , nor 
the hypnot is t , have any preconceptions about 
who the criminal might be. If such precon-
ceptions do exis t — e i the r based on informa-
t i on acquired before the hypnotic procedure 
or on information subtly communicated during 
t h e h y p n o t i c p r o c e d u r e - - h y p n o s i s may 
readi ly cause the subject to confabulate the 
person who i s suspected into his "hypnoti-
c a l l y enhanced" memories. These pseudo-
memories o r i g i n a l l y developed in hypnosis may 
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come to be accepted by the subject as his 
a c t u a l r e c a l l of the o r ig ina l events; they 
are then remembered with g r e a t s u b j e c t i v e 
ce r t a in ty and reported with convict ion? Such 
circumstances can create convincing apparent-
ly o b j e c t i v e " e y e w i t n e s s e s " r a t h e r than 
f a c i l i t a t i n g actual r e c a l l . (Some emphasis 
added.) 
Dr. Putnam in his a r t i c l e , Hypnosis and Dis tor t ions in 
Eyewitness Memory included in Appel lant ' s Addendum at page 99 of 
that Addendum concludes: 
Many c o u r t s c u r r e n t l y admit testimony 
from previously hypnotized witnesses without 
an adequate understanding of the nature of 
hypnosis and i t s dangers to t ru ly independent 
r e c a l l . Perhaps influenced by often naive 
l e g a l s c h o l a r s h i p and biased expe r t t e s -
timony, these courts apparently bel ieve that 
cross examination and expert witness a t tacks 
on the c r e d i b i l i t y of such tes t imony will 
reveal any shortcomings in the hypnosis and 
get to the t r u t h . This hope is misplaced. 
Even if the hypnotist takes consummate care , 
the sub j ec t may s t i l l incorporate into his 
reco l lec t ion some fantas ies or clues from the 
hypno t i s t ' s manner or he may be rendered more 
s u s c e p t i b l e to sugges t i ons made before or 
a f t e r t h e h y p n o s i s . A w i t n e s s canno t 
i den t i fy h i s t r u e memories from h y p n o s i s . 
Nor can any expert separate them out . Worse, 
previously hypnotized witnesses often develop 
a c e r t i t u d e about t h e i r memories t h a t 
o rd ina ry witnesses seldom exhibitT Further 
harm i s caused by e x p e r t w i t n e s s e s who, 
t e s t i f y i n g on t h e s t a t e ' s b e h a l f , make 
e x t r a v a g a n t , s c i e n t i f i c a l l y u n j u s t i f i e d 
claims about the r e l i a b i l i t y of hypnotical ly 
enhanced testimony. The plain fact is that 
such testimony i s not and cannot be r e l i a b l e . 
The only s e n s i b l e approach i s to exclude 
tes t imony from p r e v i o u s l y hypnot ized w i t -
nesses as a matter of law, on the ground that 
the witness has been rendered incompetent to 
t e s t i f y . (Emphasis added) 
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The observations actually recalled by Patricia Tyrell 
are probably more accurately described in her pre-hypnotic 
interviews with the authorities. After hypnosis, she reported 
that voice (angry phone call) to have been Preston Mitchell's 
voice. Although prior to hypnosis she did not know whether Greco 
and Mitchell even knew each other, after hypnosis she indicated 
that they knew each other very well by reporting that "it was 
like Greco and Preston always. They hang out together and 
everything." Prior to hypnosis she could not tell whether or not 
Fred Duncan even knew Preston Mitchell; however, after hypnosis 
she was able to say that, "He (Duncan) hated Preston Mitchell. 
He despised the man." She also reported that her feelings that 
it was Preston Mitchell were much stronger after the hypnosis. 
All of these facts are compounded by the fact that Patricia 
Tyrell after being hypnotized viewed the hypnotic session four or 
five times prior to testifying at the preliminary hearing. 
Perhaps of most importance is the fact that prior to 
hypnosis, as she related to Frank Bell, she saw no features of 
the man, and could only described him in general terms, and was 
asked specifically whether or not he was wearing a mask and 
indicated that she "did not see." However, after hypnosis she 
was able to report that he did have something over his face, that 
he pulled on something when he said, "You bastard!" 
Both prosecutors in their closing arguments to the jury 
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stressed the fact that according to Tyrell, Mitchell was wearing 
a mask when he entered the Brian Oliver residence. 
While the fact that Preston Mitchell is the individual 
that shot Fred Duncan is not and was not disputed at trial
 f the 
issue of whether the homicide occurred in an accidental fashion 
as the Defendant so testified, or intentionally as supported by 
the existence of the mask, was the critical issue in the trial. 
The existence of the stocking over the individual's face indi-
cates that the shooting was planned and premeditated and cuts 
specifically against the Defendant's contention that the shooting 
was accidental. All of Patricia Tyrell's testimony prior to 
hypnosis was consistent with the way in which the Defendant 
testified the accident happened. The existence of the mask, 
which only came out after hypnosis, was the one fact which could 
not be reconciled with the Defendant's testimony and which 
ultimately was a critical and crucial fact convicting the 
Defendant of this crime. 
All of this must be weighed against the constitutional 
standard applied to harmless error. Article I, Section 12, of 
the Utah State Constitution provides among other things that an 
accused shall have the right to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion protects the accused's right to confront and cross examine 
witnesses. The United State Supreme Court in Chapman v. Califor-
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nia , 386 U.S. 18 (1967) , 87 S.Ct. 824f held that before a 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the reviewing court 
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This rule has been referred to as the "harm-
less constitutional error rule." The Utah Supreme Court in State 
v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (1982) involving a defendant's right to 
confront witnesses, adopted the Chapman "harmless constitutional 
error" rule, concluding that the error must be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Consequently, before this Court may declare the error 
complained of, that is the diminished right to confront witnesses 
as a result of hypnosis and its "hardening effect," the State 
must prove that there is not a reasonable possibility that the 
evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction, 
or put differently, this Court must conclude and declare a belief 
that the error complained of was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
This the State is unable to do. The prosecutors in 
this case considered the fact that the intruder wore a mask to be 
so significant that both prosecutors mentioned and argued that 
fact in their closing arguments to the jury. Tr. of closing 
arguments January 29, 1986, p. 10, 34, 40. This Court ought not 
conclude that the error complained of here is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt and for such reason this Court should order a 
32 
new trial. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVER-
SIBLE ERROR BY ADMITTING TESTIMONY 
DERIVED FROM THE INTERCEPTION OF A 
TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE DEFENDANT 
It is Defendant's position that his conviction ought to 
be reversed because the trial court admitted evidence obtained in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated, 77-23-8-1, et seq., 1982. Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-23-8-2(4) states as follows: 
To safeguard the privacy of innocent 
persons, the interception of wire or oral 
communications when none of the parties to 
the communication has consented to the 
interception, should be allowed only when 
authorized by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion and should remain under the control and 
supervision of the authorizing court. 
Interception of wire and oral communications 
should further be limited to certain types of 
offenses and specific categories of crime 
with assurance that the interception is 
justified and that the information obtained 
thereby will not be misused. 
Respondent's contention is that Utah Code Annotated Section 77-
23-8-4(2) describes lawful intercepts. AT&T operator Jeanette 
Guffy overheard the collect phone call from Park City to Miami in 
which Preston Mitchell admitted to killing someone. Respondent 
maintains that this act falls within the ambit of lawful inter-
cepts provided for in Section 77-23-8-4. Respondent charac-
terizes Ms. Guffy1s intercept as lawful because it was not 
willful. While there appears to be no law on point in the State 
of Utah, a number of other jurisdictions have addressed this 
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i s s u e . In People v . S p o r l e d e r , 666 P.2d 135 (Co. 1983), the 
Court set forth the policy discouraging phone in tercept ion and an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s expec t a t i on of p r i v a c y . The Court noted that a 
telephone subscriber has an actual expectation tha t the d ia l ing 
of t e lephone numbers from a home telephone would be free from 
governmental in t rus ion . I£ . at 141. The Court went on to note 
tha t a telephone is a necessary component of modern l i f e and is a 
personal and business necess i ty indispensible to one 's a b i l i t y to 
communicate in today 's complex soc ie ty . Id. The Court s tated 
that when a telephone ca l l i s made, i t i s as if two people were 
having a p r i v a t e c o n v e r s a t i o n . Ld. In the Sporleder case , 
d i sc losure of the numbers dialed by the telephone subscriber was 
made to the te lephone company for in ternal business purposes. 
Id . The Court held t h a t t h i s does not a l t e r the c a l l e r ' s 
expectation of privacy and transpose i t into an assumed r i sk of 
d i s c l o s u r e to the government. 1^ 3. On the matter of assumed 
r i s k , the Court noted t h a t " i t i s somewhat i d l e to speak of 
assuming r i s k s in a context where, as a p rac t i ca l mat te r , the 
te lephone s u b s c r i b e r has no r e a l i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e . " 1(3. The 
Court i nd i ca t ed t h a t i t was convinced t h a t the d e f e n d a n t ' s 
e x p e c t a t i o n tha t numbers dialed would remain free from govern-
mental i n t r u s i o n was r e a s o n a b l e . I^d. The government is not 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y permitted to add to those r i s k s . 1(3. In the 
case of Arnold v . S t a t e , 610 P.2d 1210 (N.M. 1980), the Court 
34 
noted that the intent of the legislature had to be considered. 
Id. at 1212. So it should be here. (See U.C.A. 77-23-8-2(4).) 
When determining whether the interception was made with or 
without consent, the consent of the sender of the message is 
controlling. 1(3. at 1213. In other words, consent had to be 
given by the person initiating the phone call. Clearly, no such 
consent was given in this case. While some states have recog-
nized that an individual takes a risk that the person with whom 
he is conversing might memorize or relay the conversation, Cooper 
v. State, 671 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Okla. 1983), this does not apply 
to the instant case. Indeed, in the case of State v. Dwyer, 585 
P.2d 900 (Ariz. 1978), the operators listened to the phone 
conversation for some fifteen minutes. I<3. at 901. One of the 
parties to the call was eventually accused of murder. L3. at 
902. The Court required exclusion of the testimony of the 
telephone operators because it was deemed to be willful. I<3. at 
903. While the telephone conversation in the instant case was 
only overheard for a brief time, the other factors and policies 
set forth in the Dwyer case are equally applicable to the case at 
bar. In State v. Forrester, 587 P.2d 179 (Wash. 1978), the 
Court's chief concern was whether or not the communication was 
intended to be private and whether or not this expectation of 
privacy was reasonable. 1^ 3. at 184. Mr. Mitchell clearly 
intended his call to be private and his expectation was clearly a 
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reasonable one. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse 
Defendant's conviction and order a new trial. 
DATED this 24th day of September, 1987. 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Attorney for Defendant 
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